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Abstract
As the threat of cyber attack grows ever larger, new
approaches to security are required. While there are
several different types of intrusion detection systems
(IDS), collaborative IDS (CIDS) offers particular
promise in identifying distributed, coordinated attacks
that might otherwise elude detection.
Even for
CIDS, there are unresolved issues associated with
trusting participants and aggregating data. Blockchain
technology appears capable of addressing those
issues if practical implementation strategies can
be developed.
To that end, we implement an
Ethereum blockchain-based CIDS leveraging pluggable
authentication modules. Our system is specifically
crafted to detect doorknob rattling attacks by immutably
recording login activity in a blockchain-protected
ledger.

1.

Introduction

There is no doubt that cyber attacks are an
ever-growing threat. Statistics collected by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office (GAO) indicate that
the number of reported attacks against federal agencies
has steadily increased by an average of 8,000 attacks
per year for more than a decade [1], the Department
of Defense estimates that 36 million email attacks take
place against defense infrastructures every day [2], and
an estimated 10% of U.S. residents over the age of 16
were victims of cyber-perpetrated identity theft in 2016
alone [3]. Surveying this threat landscape, there is a
clear need for more effective defensive tools.
One of the most commonly used defenses is
intrusion detection [4]. The objective of such systems
is to recognize anomalous behavior either within the
network as a whole or within individual hosts. Although
there are variations, the work flow illustrated in Figure
1 is representative of the basic tasks IDS accomplish en
route to flagging anomalies.
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Figure 1. General Flow Chart for Intrusion Detection

The flow begins with feature identification and ingest
into the system before processing and analysis facilitate
anomaly detection. Networked-based IDS monitor
network-wide behavior, for example traffic volume or
diversity, in order to detect the changes in patterns
that indicate an attack. In contrast, host-based IDS
observe local events like log-in attempts or unusual
privilege escalation in an effort to flag undesirable
activity.
While these approaches are effective in
monitoring a single system or network, they are unable
to detect highly distributed attacks due to the lack of
communication amongst stand-alone IDS across a major
network or system [5]. To overcome this shortfall,
hybrid approaches that blend host-based monitoring,
network-based statistics, and aggregate reporting of both
across sets of nodes have emerged. This is the realm of
Collaborative IDS (CIDS).
CIDS employ sensors to pool data from across
the protected network for follow on anomaly detection
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analysis. Some touted advantages of CIDS include
increased detection accuracy and significantly reduced
work for security administrators [6].
CIDS are classified as centralized, hierarchical,
or distributed. Specific implementation details of
these various types of CIDS are covered in greater
detail by Vasilomanolakis et al.
[5], but the
disadvantages of centralized and hierarchical systems
hinge on their dependency on just a few nodes [7].
Conversely, distributed CIDS overcome this dependency
by spreading the data collection and analysis tasks
across the network. However, this architecture also has
implementation issues related to creating consensus and
trust between peered nodes in the distributed system.
To facilitate wider adoption of distributed CIDS in
light of its many advantages [5], we explore leveraging
blockchain technology to address challenges of trust and
consensus.
Many industries are exploring how blockchain
technology might improve their processes; cyber
security is no different. We offer a basic overview of
blockchain technology to highlight the tenets important
for our proposed application, but further detail regarding
blockchain is beyond the scope of this paper and can be
found in references [8] and [9]. The critical component
of blockchain technology for CIDS applications is its
mechanism of validating and storing data with no need
for a central, trusted authority.
When data, sometimes called transactions because of
blockchain technology’s cryptocurrency roots, are ready
for storage, they are sent to all participating nodes for
consensus-based validation. Groups of validated data
form blocks, which are completed via the addition of
a cryptographic hash linking them to the full chain of
previously archived data. The process of developing
that hash is often called mining. The crucial benefit of
these cryptographic hashes is that once a block is added
to the chain and approved via distributed consensus,
it cannot be removed or edited without overcoming
significant cryptographic barriers simultaneously at a
consensus-inducing portion of the nodes.
For a collaborative intrusion detection system that
leveraged blockchain to facilitate sharing of system logs,
this means an attacker would have to simultaneously
overcome computationally expensive cryptographic
barriers on a large number of separately secured
machines to erase the record of their actions. There
are three types of blockchain ledgers currently in use:
public, consortium, and private [10]. Public blockchain
systems allow anyone with internet access and a desire
to participate to do so. Consortium blockchain systems
are maintained by an established body that grants access
to others. Private blockchain systems are maintained by

one entity that provides permissions to others. More
detailed information can be found in [10]. Depending
on the CIDS use case, different ledgers might apply.
Our focus in this research effort is to address
trust and consensus in the data ingestion phase of
CIDS. We investigate the feasibility of overlaying a
blockchain network on an existing network to facilitate
trustworthy data collection in support of intrusion
detection. Building on the conceptual blockchain-based
CIDS introduced by Alexopolous et al [7], we propose a
specific and practical implementation.
The primary contribution of this paper is
the characterization of a CIDS leveraging a
private Ethereum-hosted blockchain and pluggable
authentication modules (PAM) to create a distributed
collaborative intrusion detection system capable of
flagging some types of attacks. The system is novel
is its use of PAM to log authentication events as
they are occurring. The combination of PAM with
blockchain technology’s distributed immutable ledger
offers a unique approach to preventing attackers from
modifying system logs in an attempt to obfuscate
malicious activity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 details the problems in distributed
collaborative intrusion detection and how blockchain
technology addresses those concerns, Section 3 provides
our solution approach, and Section 4 details the specifics
of our implementation.

2.

Improving data ingest in CIDS via
blockchain

Each of the tasks in Figure 1 is a rich area for
investigation with a variety of complex approaches
available. Our research focus is improving the data
ingest and acquisition process. Imagine a scenario
in which a network is comprised of several nodes
where each monitors and reports various events. The
confidence in the anomaly detection capabilities of
the system as a whole begins with confidence in the
accuracy and completeness of the record of events of
interest.
The problem of maintaining accuracy and
completeness is even more difficult when a coordinated
attack takes place [5]. When coordinated attacks
are choreographed to maintain a low volume or rate
at any one host, respectful of common intrusion
detection activity thresholds, the network must be able
to aggregate events to be able to respond. Consider
the example of the doorknob rattling attack on a
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition system
wherein an adversary attempts common login/password
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combinations on several machines in the network,
maintaining a low number of login attempts per device
[11]. For the attack to succeed, the adversary need only
gain remote access to one of these devices [11]. This
type of attack is difficult to detect without CIDS. As
evidence, consider the nominal log traces presented in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Nominal doorknob rattling attack
detection via CIDS. The CIDS compiles reports from
individual IDSs to track network activity as the sum
of reported activity.

In this scenario, ten stand alone IDS are tracking
login rate, with a CIDS aggregating login data across the
system as a whole. If either the local or aggregate login
rate is larger than a specified threshold, an alert would
be triggered. For the ten stand alone IDS expecting
to record between zero and three logins per reporting
period, a detection threshold of unusual activity might
be set at four. Still, on average, half would have ignored
the 11:00am doorknob rattling attack as it involves just
two extra login attempts per system. This activity
level disappears in the normal network activity on any
one node. In contrast, the attack clearly stands out in
the CIDS log trace, easing the complexity required in
the follow on data processing and analysis phases of
anomaly detection.
Blockchain technology brings an added benefit in
log preservation. If an adversary is successful in
accessing a more traditional, centralized CIDS, they
could alter the access log to remove evidence of the
attack, as hackers often tamper with evidence of their
presence on a system to thwart future forensic analysis
[12], but editing the cryptographically protected,
distributed log stored via blockchain on all ten nodes is
significantly more difficult.

3.

Proposed blockchain-based approach

The doorknob rattling scenario from Section 2
showed the need for a collaborative system to detect
certain attacks.
Vasilomanolakis et al.
[5] and
Alexopolous et al. [7] lay out the principal requirements
of such a system, which are compiled in Table 1.
Table 1. CIDS Requirements, compiled from [5, 7]

Accountability Actions taken by a participating
node must be tied to that node.
Integrity
Data cannot be modified once
entered into the system.
Resilience
The system should not depend on
small numbers of node and must
avoid single points of failure.
Consensus
Nodes in the system must reach
consensus about the quality and
trustworthiness of data.
Scalability
The system must be able to scale to
larger numbers of agents.
Overhead
Overhead must be minimized to
allow flexibility of the system.
Privacy
Depending on the type of system,
some level of privacy must be
considered for participants.
There are clear trade-offs between the attributes
specified in the table.
For example, there are
often conflicts between privacy and accountability [7].
Furthermore, depending on where such a system would
be utilized, the requirements shift. For example,
database entries with private customer account details
require different privacy considerations than logs of
privilege escalation on a controlled system. Framing
the design of CIDS in the context of these requirements
is useful toward capturing the key characteristics of
the system while minimizing overhead and cost. For
example, overlaying data encryption using a public key
infrastructure necessarily increases overhead and thus
should be implemented only when needed [7].
The blockchain-based system loosely described
in Section 2 fulfills the requirements in Table 1,
with support as follows: Because each transaction
contains a sender and a receiver that cannot be
modified once added to the chain, the requirement
of accountability is met. Further, once approved
transactions are added to the chain they cannot be
modified without overcoming significant cryptographic
barriers [9], fulfilling the requirement of integrity.
Resilience and consensus are both met via blockchain’s
embedded distributed consensus mechanisms [8], which
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Figure 3. Blockchain Solution for CIDS

can be implemented to ensure single points of failure
are avoided and graceful degradation is possible. As
evidenced by wide use of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin
and Ethereum, blockchain is scalable with appropriate
implementation considerations. The cryptocurrency use
case also demonstrates that privacy can be achieved
in blockchain-based systems via the assignment of
non-attributable identities.
As Alexopoulous et al.
[7] note, overhead
can be a problem for blockchain systems, but it is
dependent on consensus mechanism and other design
decisions and can be mitigated via techniques like
alert hashes and bloom filters.
To satisfy these
requirements, Alexopoulous et al. [7] propose a
CIDS framework utilizing a secure distributed ledger
implemented by blockchain technology to exchange
alerts between collaborating nodes.
These alerts
become the transactions of the blockchain system.
Depending on the types of attacks or behaviors that an
organization is worried about, different metrics must
be utilized. A more detailed discussion on different
metrics can be found in [13]. As a few key examples,
finding an adversary running unwanted programs might
require logging CPU utilization statistics. Source and
destination ports for data access requests could be
another potential metric of interest. To thwart the
doorknob rattling attack from Section 2, the transactions
should include all login attempts.
We develop a CIDS to thwart the doorknob rattling
attack by leveraging blockchain technology to facilitate
a distributed ledger of login and authentication attempts
aggregated across a network. The basic architecture of
the system is displayed in Figure 3.
We make a few assumptions in this general
approach. First, for most organizations, a private
ledger is the most logical mechanism for this log, with

the system administrator validating participant identity
upon initialization of the system, at a minimum, which
leads to our second assumption that we have a priori
knowledge of participants on the network. Although the
ledger in Figure 3 is pictured in the center of the nodes,
this is only to emphasize that consensus is maintained
on the ledger’s contents; it is physically stored at every
node to maintain the distributed attributes important to
the system’s benefits. Data from the private ledger can
be used for processing and statistical analysis much like
in any other IDS, with the specific anomaly detection
mechanism outside the scope of this paper.
In the solution proposed in [7], nodes are categorized
as either monitoring units or analysis units. Any node
in the blockchain network can be either although the
technical requirements for each will be different. Some
systems may also require two layers of communication:
an alert layer and a consensus layer to allow flexibility
in scenarios where permissioned viewing lists are
necessary to achieve required privacy levels [7].
The range of scenarios that the system must handle
will heavily influence design decisions, but to focus our
initial investigation, we considered the case illustrated
in Figure 3, where all nodes participate fully as both
monitoring and analysis units.
Our CIDS leverages commercially available and
open-source products. The Ethereum platform provides
our blockchain-based distributed ledger via the testnet
functionality. More specific information on Ethereum
can be found in [14]. We leveraged the standard
go-ethereum client and the private test network
functionality for all experiments. Our test bed consists
of two Linux Ubuntu 18.04.1 systems with the Ethereum
client running on both, as depicted in Figure 4. Although
more work is needed to specifically quantify the
performance requirements for blockchain-based CIDS,
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our test bed demonstrates that at least for small scale
implementations, generic hardware is adequate to run
the CIDS with sufficient capacity preserved for general
computing.

Figure 4. CIDS set up used in experiments

A sample transaction from our test network is shown
in Figure 5. The input field carries the critical login
data that we wish to permanently preserve as a hex
string. The other fields deal with the nuts and bolts of
cyrptocurrency transactions and are beyond the scope of
this paper, refer to [14] for further explanation.

the common-auth file, we ensured that every time an
authentication request was made, it would be logged.
This not only includes initial login attempts, but any
other service that requires user authentication, such as
the use of sudo to escalate privilege. The pam exec
module allowed us to run an external Bash script that
had access to all of these environment variables.
That Bash script calls a Python script, feeding
it those variables. We interact with the Ethereum
client though the Web3 library in Python. Using the
information passed by pam exec and our Bash script,
a node in our CIDS submits a transaction wherein
the data field contains a hex string encoding the user,
service, time, and type of authentication. Once a
mining operation takes place to produce a new block, the
transaction is codified into the ledger and can be viewed
by any node in the CIDS.
Table 2. PAM Items Exported as Environment
Variables by pam exec, compiled from [15]

PAM RHOST
PAM RUSER
PAM SERVICE
PAM USER
PAM TYPE

4.
Figure 5. Example Ethereum Transaction

For the Linux operating system, including the
Ubuntu 18.04.1 distribution used in our test network,
PAM offer a suite of shared libraries to facilitate local
control over how applications authenticate users [15].
When a user attempts to login, our system goes through
the typical Linux authentication process but makes an
additional call to pam exec, which permits the system
to run an external command. Note that the call to
the pam exec module must be put into the correct
PAM service file (in Ubuntu the service file location is
/etc/pam.d). We used the common-auth service to call
a Bourne Again SHell (Bash) script that interacted with
our Ethereum client. The pam exec module sets several
environmental variables that record several important
pieces of information for logging purposes. A subset
of these variables are shown in Table 2. By altering

Remote user attempting to
authenticate.
Remote host that is being
authenticated to.
Service module that made
request.
User that made request
Type of module (account,
auth, password, open-session,
close-session)

Validation and Results

With the CIDS in place, we simulated a doorknob
rattling attack against one of our machines. In this test,
the victims were different user accounts on a single
machine. Output from our CIDS ledger is shown in
Figure 6. The attacking machine (172.20.157.112)
attempted to login to each victim user account three
times via secure shell (SSH). With our modified
common-auth file in place, the CIDS recorded each
login attempt as a separate transaction in the blockchain
as depicted in Figure 6. The logged information is
summarized in Table 3.
This attack took place over 46 seconds, with 15
total login attempts across five different accounts. As
this ledger is visible from any CIDS node, extraction
of these login attempts for follow on analysis toward
anomaly detection is possible from any of the distributed
participants. Although beyond the scope of the current
experiment, our system might have then responded by
blocking any subsequent traffic from the attack-related
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Table 4. Summary of doorknob rattling attack
events, multi-attacker

Figure 6. Doorknob rattling attack in ledger
Table 3. Summary of doorknob rattling attack
events, single attacker

User

IP Address
of Request

user1
user2
user3
user4
user5

172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112

Number of
Login
Attempts
3
3
3
3
3

Duration
of Attack
(seconds)
7
10
9
11
9

internet protocol (IP) address.
In a second experiment, multiple attackers acted
against our victim machine. Output from the ledger
in this case is shown in Figure 7. This scenario
contained two attackers that acted in differing ways,
as revealed by the detail the ledger contains. The
first attacker (172.20.148.85) made all of its SSH
requests simultaneously whereas the second attacker
(172.20.157.112) made its SSH requests in sequence.
This simple difference can reveal some information
about the attacking machine. The first attacker was
a Windows machine using the puTTY program for its
SSH requests. The second attacker was another Ubuntu
machine using OpenSSH to conduct its login attempts.
The differing nature of these programs can be seen from
the log entries in Figure 7. A summary of the attack is
shown in Table 4. There were a total of 24 login attempts
via two attackers across a time interval of 43 seconds.

Figure 7. Multi-attacker doorknob rattling attack in
ledger

User

IP Address
of Request

user1
user2
user3
user4
user5
user1
user2
user3
user4
user5

172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.157.112
172.20.148.85
172.20.148.85
172.20.148.85
172.20.148.85
172.20.148.85

Number of
Login
Attempts
3
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
1
2

In both experiments, indications of the attack were
submitted for inclusion in the CIDS distributed ledger
within approximately 1.10 seconds of attack initiation,
well faster than log entries could be manually modified
by an attacker. This rapid indication of the event and
protection of related data could facilitate action in time
to protect other network nodes in near real time and
also ensures a trustworthy forensic record of the attack
events is preserved for follow on analysis. Although
a specialized system might improve functionality
and efficiency, we have concluded that Ethereum’s
unaltered testnet blockchain client integrates smoothly
with existing Linux system architecture to accomplish
data ingest toward intrusion detection with minimal
adjustment or overhead and sufficient fidelity.

5.

Conclusion

We have implemented a CIDS capable of
immutably recording login activity via a private
blockchain-based ledger.
Our initial experiments
show that blockchain-based CIDS is a viable method
for detection of doorknob rattling attacks, preserving
activity records more quickly than an intruder could
act to modify them. These positive indications validate
continued research.
The system engineered in this paper is small in
scale. Creating a larger testbed would be the first step in
further exploration of our approach. Additional research
must also be conducted to determine how the system
would work at scale with several types of devices. One
issue that would need to be addressed as the system
increases in scale is the network overhead to support the
blockchain client. Developing an understanding of the
overhead of a blockchain client must be a priority for
this research to move forward.
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Further, the system developed in this paper utilized
the Ethereum client. This client was designed to
support cryptocurrency functionality; a CIDS-specific
blockchain apparatus might differ significantly in terms
of consensus algorithm, transaction formatting, and
other details.
Work is needed to explore what
that customization should entail.
If designing a
CIDS-specific blockchain system proves too high of a
hurdle, additional research into which general purpose
blockchain client best meets CIDS requirements should
be conducted.
Finally, more work is also necessary to explore how
this blockchain-based data ingest module will interact
with follow on filtering and processing of data and
the other remaining steps in the intrusion detection
process outlined in Figure 1. There is potential for the
blockchain system itself to provide enhanced detection
of attacks. For example, an increased activity level
in the blockchain could indicate some attack without
necessitating inspection of individual transactions.
The sharing of information between cyber defenders
has become crucial toward preventing distributed attacks
against the system as a whole. CIDS are one way in
which to address this need, and blockchain technology
appears to be well-suited for the task of ingesting data
in a distributed and secure fashion. While it is true that
blockchain is not a solution to every type of problem, it
shows promise in this area.
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